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Inequality, Distributive Beliefs and Protests:  
A Recent Story from Latin America 
Patricia Justino and Bruno Martorano  
 
 
Summary 
This paper analyses the role of perceptions of inequality and distributive beliefs in motivating 
people to engage in protests. The paper focuses on the case of Latin America, where an 
interesting paradox has been observed: despite considerable reductions in inequality, most 
countries in Latin America have experienced increases in protests and civil unrest in the last 
decade. In order to understand this paradox, we analyse the relationship between inequality 
and protests in recent years in Latin America, using micro-level data on individual 
participation in protests in 2010, 2012 and 2014. The results show that civil protests are 
driven by distributive beliefs and not by levels of inequality because individual judgments and 
reactions are based on own perceptions of inequality that may or may not match absolute 
levels of inequality. The results also point to the important role of government policy in 
affecting perceptions of inequality and ensuring social and political stability. 
 
Keywords: Perception of inequality, inequality, distributive beliefs, protests, Latin America. 
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Introduction 
Protests have erupted in many countries during the recent economic crisis. These have 
included the ‘Occupy’ movement in US and demonstrations against austerity in Europe. A 
large body of literature has explored the potential causes of social mobilisation and the 
reasons motivating people to engage in protests (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, van Stekelenburg 
and Klandermans 2013). An influential strand of this literature postulates that civil unrest is 
driven by rising disparities: inequality fuels social discontent and motivates people to mobilise 
through non-violent or violent means (Gurr 1970). In a recent study, Ortiz et al. (2013: 16) 
argue that “the majority of global protests for economic justice and against austerity manifest 
peoples’ indignation at the gross inequalities between ordinary communities and rich 
individuals/corporations”.  
 
Yet, empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality, social mobilisation and civil 
protests is limited and ambiguous. Nollert (1995) reports that rises in inequality lead to 
increases in protests. Griffin and de Jonge (2014) argue that inequality results in the 
polarisation of citizens, and their participation in non-violent demonstrations. In contrast to 
these findings, Dubrow et al. (2008) show that rising inequalities have resulted in reductions 
in the number of protesters in both ‘old’ and ‘new’ European democracies. Similarly, Solt 
(2015: 14) argues that “more inequality does not enhance poorer individuals’ sense of 
relative deprivation in ways that make them more likely to engage in protest”. The argument 
that inequality drives protests also does not seem to hold in light of recent events in Latin 
America. Despite considerable reductions in inequality (Cornia 2014), most countries in Latin 
America have experienced increases in protests and civil instability in the last decade (UNDP 
2013, Ortiz et al. 2013). If not inequality, what motivates people to protest?  
 
This paper analyses what motivations lead different individuals to mobilise and protest based 
on detailed micro-level data collected across 18 countries in Latin America in 2010, 2012 and 
2014. The results show that individual participation in protests was largely motivated by 
perceptions of inequality which affected their distributional beliefs. These did not match 
reductions in the Gini coefficient. Despite large reductions of inequality, driven by efforts to 
raise incomes among the poorest groups, people across Latin America – the middle classes, 
in particular – remained dissatisfied with their governments and the quality of institutions and 
public services. Economic growth and inequality reduction have been insufficient to shift 
people’s perceptions and beliefs, and have not matched overall expectations. Social 
discontent, in turn, has turned into collective protests. In light of these results, the paper also 
asks whether there is role for government policy to mitigate the likelihood of civil protests 
occurring in settings of under-fulfilled expectations. Findings show that while cash transfer 
policies that alleviated poverty among low-income groups have a negative effect on the 
probability of protests, there is large scope for better government performance in terms of 
addressing corruption, and improving the functioning of government institutions and the 
quality of public services. All these are key factors explaining the mismatch between 
perceptions of inequality, distributive beliefs and absolute levels of inequality across Latin 
America, particularly among the protesting middle-classes. 
 
The paper offers two important contributions to the literature on protests and social 
mobilisation. First, it sheds light on the determinants of social mobilisation in a region where 
protests and demonstrations are important ingredients of the policy-making process. A 
number of scholars have tried to understand the rise of protests in recent years in Latin 
America. For example, Machado et al. (2009) report that protests are correlated with the 
quality of political institutions but are unable to identify the motives behind people’s 
mobilisation. Our paper differs from this literature in that it focus on motivations at the 
individual level that may lead people to mobilise and protest. Second, we contribute to an 
emerging literature on the importance of perceptions of inequality and distributive beliefs 
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(Genicot and Ray 2014, Gimpelson and Treisman 2015, Niehues 2014, Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans 2013). We advance this literature by showing not only how perceptions of 
inequality and distributive beliefs are formed, but also their consequences in terms of citizen 
mobilisation and civil protests.  
 
The paper has also important policy implications. Our own previous work has shown that that 
increases in welfare spending contributed to reduce internal armed conflicts in Latin America 
(Justino and Martorano, 2016). A growing number of studies has also shown that welfare 
spending may affect voting behaviour in Latin American countries (Zucco 2013; Nupia 2011; 
De La O 2013; Manacorda et al. 2011). Yet, there is surprisingly limited empirical research 
on the relationship between government policy and civil protests. This paper contributes to 
this area of policy by showing how improvements in the quality of public services may be as 
important as direct social transfers in reducing the probability of individuals participating in 
collective protests.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section examines the rise of protests in recent 
years in Latin America in light of existing theoretical literature on social mobilisation, and 
discusses the main theoretical hypothesis proposed in the paper. Section 2 presents the data 
and the empirical strategy of the paper. Section 3 discusses the main results. Detailed 
robustness tests are conducted in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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1  Distributive beliefs and protests 
In the most recent study of worldwide protests, Ortiz et al. (2013) report that the Latin 
America and the Caribbean region experienced the largest incidence of protests between 
2006 and mid-2013 (141 protests), with the exception of some high-income countries. 
Examples are plentiful. In 2013, the streets of Santiago were occupied by large numbers of 
people demanding a fairer society, even though the Gini coefficient in the country decreased 
from 51.9 in 2009 to 50.4 in 2013.1 Chile experienced a wave of persistent student protests in 
2011 despite reductions in income inequality (Guzman-Concha 2012). In Brazil, despite 
substantial and persistent reductions in the Gini coefficient since 1989, protests erupted 
during the Confederations Cup and the World Cup tournament in 2013 involving more than 
1.4 million people (Layton 2014). Over the same period, large demonstrations and protests 
have been held in cities across other Latin American countries.2 These findings cast doubts 
about the accepted positive links between inequality and protests. In fact, available data 
show a negative correlation between inequality and protests in Latin America in 2010, 2012 
and 2014 (Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1 Gini coefficient and average frequency of protest participation in 18 LAC 
countries in 2010, 2012 and 2014 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC and LAPOP datasets. 
 
The hypothesis that inequality drives protests implicitly assumes that all citizens have access 
to the same set of information and have the ability to evaluate absolute levels of inequality at 
any given time. However, people have different perceptions about inequality that affect their 
distributional beliefs. Their judgments and reactions are therefore likely to be based on own 
perceptions that may or may not match absolute levels of inequality.  
 
A number of studies has shown that the majority of people are not able to assess their 
relative position in the income distribution (Brunori 2015, Fernandez-Albertos and Kuo 2013, 
Gimpelson and Treisman 2015, Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013) or to evaluate 
absolute inequality trends (Chambers, et al. 2013). Some tend to underestimate the true 
                                                          
1  Data from Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank). 
2  www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/22/latin-america-left-tough-times-brazil-argentina-venezuela.  
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level of inequality (Osberg and Smeeding 2006, Norton and Ariely 2011), while others tend to 
overestimate it (Chambers et al. 2013). This is because human behaviour is not motivated by 
objective facts but results from cognitive elaborations based on external perceptions (van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013).  
 
There are reasons to believe that people’s perceptions of inequality in Latin America are at 
odds with absolute reductions in levels of inequality. Saad-Filho and Morais (2014) argue 
that, following the rapid economic growth experienced over the last decade, Latin American 
countries have become victims of their own success. Perceived forms of social change have 
not matched the expectations and aspirations of the vast majority of the population, leading 
to social discontent that eventually erupted into protests. This is in line with Huntington 
(2006), who argued that processes of modernisation may lead to new life standards 
alongside rising frustration and dissatisfaction when ‘transitional societies’ are not able to 
satisfy people’s aspirations and expectations. Fukuyama (2015) has also linked recent 
protests in emerging economies to the inability of their governments to meet the increasing 
economic and social expectations of the new global middle class. A similar argument has 
been used to explain the persistence of conflict and violence in India during the last decade 
of rapid economic growth  where “those made to wait unconscionably long for ‘trickle-down’ – 
people with dramatically raised but mostly unfulfillable aspirations – have become vulnerable 
to demagogues promising national regeneration” (Mishra 2014, quoted in Genicot and Ray 
2015: 1).  
 
Niehues (2014) shows that there is a strong correlation between perceptions of inequality 
and preferences for redistribution, even though people are not able to assess actual levels of 
inequality. This is because the formation of distributive beliefs depends largely on how 
individuals or social groups perceive their position in society in relation to others (Karandikar 
et al. 1998, Koszegi and Rabin 2006, Verme et al. 2014), which may or may not be related to 
changes in absolute levels of inequality. Distributive beliefs may also be related to people’s 
levels of aversion to inequality. The famous tunnel parable of Hirschman and Rothschild 
(1973) describes how perceptions of inequality are akin to drivers being stuck in a traffic jam. 
These drivers have two choices when they observe the other lane moving: get upset and 
move lanes, or stay in their lane in hope that movements in the other cars indicate that their 
lane will start moving soon too. Individuals may accept certain levels of inequality (and 
remain in their lane) when they believe that structures within society will allow them to 
eventually move up the social ladder (Benabou and Ok 2001). However, if individuals do not 
believe their situation will improve, discontent may rise. For example, Grosfeld and Senik 
(2010) report that absolute levels of inequality and people`s expectations about their future 
economic status were positively correlated during the first period of Poland’s economic 
transition. The situation changed after a few years when unfulfilled expectations led to 
dissatisfaction toward economic and political institutions.  
 
Under these circumstances, individuals may attempt to change policy-making processes 
using conventional democratic channels such as voting in elections, resorting to increased 
participation in political parties, write petitions to their political representatives and so forth. 
However, unfulfilled expectations may also lead to lower trust in formal institutions, 
particularly when people blame the government for fuelling (perceived) disparities (Fischer 
and Torgler 2013) or for failing to redistribute resources adequately or provide public goods 
and services (Shapiro 2002). In this case, social discontent and anger could increase the 
propensity of individuals and/or groups engaging in protests (Flechtner 2014). For instance, 
Corcoran et al. (2015) show that perceptions of injustice are correlated with the participation 
of individuals in different types of social action, ranging from signing petitions to the 
occupation of buildings and factories. In Chile, Castillo et al. (2015) report that distributive 
beliefs about the fairness of income distributions have affected individual participation both in 
elections and in protests.   
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But protests require mobilisation into collective action, which is dependent on the ability of 
individuals to coordinate and commit given a set of information constraints (Tarrow 1998). 
This collective action problem might be in principle solved by forms of social embeddedness 
and local networks (Gurin et al. 1980, Putnam 1993). In a recent work, Scacco (2008) shows 
that economic grievance and membership in certain types of neighbourhood level networks 
explain individual participation in riots in two Nigerian cities. Fukuyama (2015) argues that 
promoters of the Arab Spring, as well as of protests in Brazil and Turkey, were technology-
savvy young people, who make a large use of social media. These factors suggest that the 
links between inequality and civil unrest are more complex than so far depicted in the 
literature – an issue we will investigate in detail over the next sections for the case of Latin 
America. 
 
2  Data and empirical strategy 
In this section, we test empirically the relationship between beliefs about distributive justice 
and civil protests. The empirical analysis is based on three cross-sectional datasets from the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted in 2010, 2012 and 2014 for 
eighteen countries.3 The surveys are representative of all people of voting age and reports 
information related to different areas, including economic and political participation. The 
surveys included 31,671 individuals in 2010, 29,256 in 2012 and 28,889 in 2014. We use 
these datasets to estimate the following logit model, which pools data from the three waves:  
 
𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑗 + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
 
where i, j and t identify, respectively, individual, country and year. uijt is the idiosyncratic error 
term. The main dependent variable has the value one if the respondent reported having 
participated in a demonstration or protest in the 12 months prior to the survey. About 7 per 
cent of respondents on average reported having participated in a protest in the 12 months 
prior to each survey wave. They are in general younger, more educated and more likely to be 
male, single and in employment (or studying) than individuals that did not participate in 
protests (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Protest: Mean characteristics of respondents 
 
 
Respondents who have not participated 
in a demonstration or protest march 
during the last 12 months 
Respondents who have participated in a 
demonstration or protest march during 
the last 12 months 
Female 0.51 0.44 
Age 40.04 37.48 
Married 0.59 0.54 
Education (years of) 9.19 10.73 
Worker 0.52 0.60 
Student 0.07 0.11 
Ends_meet: from 1  - income is good 
enough for you and you can save from it) 
to 4 (income is not enough for you and 
you are having a hard time) 
2.55 2.48 
Observations 60,003 (93%) 4,730 (7%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the LAPOP datasets. 
                                                          
3  Countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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The model specifications include also a set of country (𝜌𝑖) dummies to reduce potential 
omitted variable biases, while controlling for unobservable factors likely to influence 
individual participation in protests. We also include a set of year dummies (𝜁𝑡) allowing for 
common shocks among Latin American economies since they are fairly well integrated, 
especially via trade.  
 
In order to measure distributive beliefs we use the following question: “the [country] 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich 
and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”. The resulting 
scale ranges from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’). We recoded this variable into 
a binary indicator with value 1 if the respondent strongly believed that the government should 
act to reduce inequality (the answer was 7), and zero otherwise. Almost one in respondents 
on average believe that governments should introduce necessary policies to reduce 
inequality between the rich and the poor (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Answers to the question on the need of government to reduce inequality 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the LAPOP datasets. 
 
We interpret the ‘strongly agree’ answer as indicating that the individual believes inequality is 
a problem in her country. As well documented in the literature (Niehues 2014), individuals 
that strongly support the need for redistribution are those likely to perceive the level of 
inequality in their country as too high and unfair. We expect this group of people to be more 
inclined to engage in protests. Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics about the group of 
people who strongly believe that government should act to reduce inequality, in comparison 
to other individuals. Differences between the two groups are very small.  
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Table 2.2 Distributive beliefs: Mean characteristics of respondents 
 
 
Respondents who do not strongly agree 
with the statement according to 
government has to do more in order to 
reduce inequality 
Respondents who strongly agree with 
the statement according to government 
has to do more in order to reduce 
inequality 
Female 0.51 0.51 
Age 39.51 40.24 
Married 0.58 0.59 
Education (years of) 9.37 9.25 
Worker 0.53 0.52 
Student 0.08 0.07 
Ends_meet: from 1 - income is good 
enough for you and you can save from it) 
to 4 (income is not enough for you and 
you are having a hard time) 
2.52 2.57 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the LAPOP datasets. 
 
Z identifies a set of variables introduced to control for a number of individual characteristics 
that may affect the probability of an individual joining demonstrations or protests. The first set 
of controls includes demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age, sex and 
civil status, since some studies have suggested that men and young people tend to support 
more demonstrations and civil protests (Olsen 1968, Safa 1990, Huang et al. 2015).  
 
The second group of controls includes information about occupational status and education. 
We expect workers (through labour unions) and students (through student movements) to 
engage in demonstrations and protests more than other population groups (Valenzuela 
2013). Participation may also be a positive function of the education level of the individual. 
As argued in Machado et al. (2009: 20): “such forms of political participation presuppose 
some degree of awareness and understanding of the political process that the well-educated 
are more likely to possess. In this view, the better educated are seen as better informed, 
more critical and more engaged individuals”.  
 
The third set of controls proxies for current economic conditions using information about the 
ability of people’s salary and total household income to cover expenditures. The effect of 
individual economic conditions on protest participation is a-priori ambiguous. The resource 
model of McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Tilly (1975) postulates that the availability of enough 
economic resources is a key condition for social mobilisation. Thus, rich people may 
potentially be more likely to participate in social and political life, as well as in demonstrations 
(Booth and Seligson 2008). But economic difficulties may also lead to high levels of social 
discontent, potentially also resulting in stronger participation in protests (Sen 2008). In 
addition, it is possible that people react not only to current economic conditions but also 
make comparisons between their current conditions and past economic experiences 
(Shapiro 2002). In particular, an unexpected economic shock, such as the recent economic 
crisis in 2008, may increase political participation in two different ways (Kern et al. 2015). 
First, it could affect people directly by increasing individual deprivation (via, for instance, 
income reductions, assets depreciation and job losses). We measure this individual effect 
using the following survey question: “Do you think that your economic situation is better than, 
the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?”. Second, economic shocks could 
strengthen feelings of collective deprivation through increases of job insecurity overall and 
the worsening of general economic conditions. In this case, forces beyond the individual are 
perceived to be responsible for the downturn (Van Dyke and Soule 2002). We measure this 
collective effect using the following survey question: “Do you think that the country’s current 
economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?”. 
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The fourth group of controls includes measures of political interest, political orientation and 
trust in state institutions. Political interest is measured using the following question: “How 
much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?”. In order to measure 
political orientation, we use information including in the survey about self-placement on the 
left-right political axis. Both political interest and ideological orientation play key roles in 
motivating people to engage in politics and in civil demonstrations and protests. Following 
the existing literature, our expectation is that people with a higher interest in political issues 
(Verba et al. 1995) and those of left-orientation (Dalton et al. 2010) are more inclined to 
engage in protests. Individual participation in protests may also be shaped by views about 
state institutions. We measure trust in state institutions in two ways. The first uses the 
following question: “To what extent do you respect the political institutions of [country]?”. We 
expect that those that have lower trust in political institutions to be more likely to engage and 
participate in demonstrations and protests (Machado et al. 2009). The second measures 
perceptions of corruption using the following question: “To what extent would you say the 
current administration combats (fights) government corruption?”. The expectation is that 
people who feel that the government is not doing enough to address corruption may be more 
inclined to engage in protests (Gingerich 2009).  
 
The fifth set of control variables proxies for social trust and people’s participation in local 
collective organisations. As discussed in section 1, protests require collective action, which in 
turn might be greatly facilitated by strong social relations and networks (Scacco 2008). We 
measure the strength of local social relations in two ways. The first uses information on 
social trust collected using the following question: “And speaking of the people from around 
here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat 
trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?”. The second measures direct individual 
engagement in existing collective organisations such as religious, political and community 
improvement committees or associational organisations. In this, it is important also to 
consider the increased relevance of social media in population mobilisation. As explained by 
Fukuyama (2015), social media has played a central role in recent protests across the world. 
To proxy for how people are involved in social media we use the following question: “Talking 
about other things, how often do you use the internet?”. Options range from 1 (daily) to 5 
(never). We expect that people more involved in social media are also more informed about 
social and political issues and, hence, more able to participate in protests.  
 
The last set of control variables proxies for the macroeconomic conditions of each country. 
We include two variables at macro level: GDP per capita (GDPpc) and a proxy for the quality 
of democracy. Overall, richer societies are less prone to social and political conflicts 
(Bellinger and Arce, 2011). At the same time, democracy may provide people with more 
scope to voice their demands and generate a favourable environment for collective political 
activity (Bellinger and Arce 2011). The data on GDP we use are from the World Development 
Indicators. The quality of democracy is measured using the Freedom of House indicator, 
based on information on Political Rights and Civil Liberties obtained from Teorell et al. 
(2015). 
 
Table 2.3 reports the variables included in our regressions. Summary statistics and 
correlations are reported in Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.3 Variable definition, description and data sources  
 
Variable  Description 
P_Protest 
1 if the respondent has participated in a demonstration or protest march during the last 12 
months 
Distributive  beliefs 
1 if the respondent strongly agree with the statement according to government has to do more 
in order to reduce inequality 
Female Female=1; male =0 
Age Age 
Married 1 if respondent is married 
Education Years of education 
Worker 1 if respondent works 
Student 1 if respondent is a student 
Worsening nat. economic 
conditions 
1 if national economic conditions worsened 
Worsening individual 
economic conditions 
1 if individual economic conditions worsened 
Ends_meet 
From 1 (income is good enough for you and you can save from it) to 4 (income is not 
enough for you and you are having a hard time) 
Political_interest From 0 (none) to 3 (a lot) 
Ideology One means left and 10 means right 
Institution trust Respect to political institution: from 1 to 7 (high respect) 
Corruption 1 if the government did not do nothing to fight corruption 
Social trust (1) Very trustworthy to (4) Untrustworthy 
Social networks People attend meetings of political organizations once a week 
Internet How often people use internet: from 0 (never) to 4 (daily) 
GDP pc GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 
Democracy Quality of democracy ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
 
Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Protest 89188 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
redis_high 89816 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Female 89816 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 89510 39.87 17.26 15.00 99.00 
Married 89816 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
      
Ed 89412 9.32 4.50 0.00 29.00 
Worker 89816 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Student 89816 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Wnec 89816 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Wiec 89816 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
      
q10d 88210 2.54 0.83 1.00 4.00 
Ideology 72984 5.55 2.59 1.00 10.00 
int_pol 89150 1.10 0.97 0.00 3.00 
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Institutions 87388 4.65 1.81 1.00 7.00 
Corr 89816 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
      
social_trust 88091 2.19 0.90 1.00 4.00 
orgrel 89461 1.36 1.29 0.00 3.00 
orgcom 89299 0.46 0.82 0.00 3.00 
orgpol 89028 0.22 0.60 0.00 3.00 
internet 89176 1.39 1.62 0.00 4.00 
      
GDPc 89816 4454.38 2490.12 1176.40 9773.20 
fred_house 89816 2.65 1.07 1.00 5.00 
Gini 89816 0.48 0.04 0.41 0.57 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the LAPOP datasets. 
 
3  Regression results 
3.1 Distributive beliefs and protests 
Table 3.1 reports the results of the main empirical model. Each model specification includes 
the six sets of controls, each introduced separately. The final specification includes both 
country and year fixed effects. The odds ratios representing distributive beliefs is higher than 
one and statistically significant in all the different specifications. This result supports our main 
hypothesis that protests are strongly related to distributive beliefs. As can be seen in Table 
3.1 (column 7), our preferred specification, the probability of an individual engaging in protest 
activities is 1.2 times higher for people who strongly believe that government should 
implement policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. The 
coefficient of distributive beliefs increases after the inclusion of country dummy variables.  
 
Demographic profile of protesters. Women and married people tend to participate less in 
protests: odds of participating in protest for females and married people are respectively 0.90 
and 0.94 (Table 3.1, column 7). The coefficient for age is small and statistically significant 
across several specifications, but becomes statistically insignificant after the inclusion of 
country and time dummies. As expected, employed, students and educated individuals are 
more likely to participate in civil protests. These results suggest that participants in protests 
in Latin America are, overall, well integrated within society, rather than at the its margins.  
 
Economic conditions. Participation in protests is related to people’s perceptions about their 
current and past economic conditions. In line with the literature discussed in the previous 
section, people facing economic difficulties tend to engage more in protests (the odds ratio is 
1.10 in Table 3.1, column 7). Those reporting that their economic situation has worsened are 
more likely to participate in civil protests. It is also interesting to observe that individual 
decisions to participate in protests are affected by changes in their country’s economic 
conditions. The variable measuring the country’s economic condition becomes statistically 
significant with the inclusion of year fixed effects (Table 3.1, column 7). As discussed 
previously, the worsening economic landscape at the country level may be perceived as a 
result of circumstances that go beyond individual control, thereby provoking frustration and 
motivating people to participate in protests. These results are in line with those reported by 
Kern et al. (2015) for European countries during the recent economic crisis.  
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Political engagement. In line with our prior expectations, individuals that participate in 
protests display a left-wing political orientation, as well as more interest in politics. They also 
report less trust in political institutions. The results also show that perceptions of corruption 
are important factors in explaining why people mobilise into protests. Taken together, these 
results show that people are more likely to participate in protests when they have an interest 
in politics, are not satisfied with political institutions and believe that the government is not 
doing enough to reduce corruption.    
 
Social relations and networks. People’s mobilisation into protests is affected by their levels of 
social involvement in the wider society. Anger and grievance are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions to motivate individual participation in protests. Social networks may facilitate social 
mobilisation by helping citizen to coordinate, cooperate and take to the streets. Table 3.1  
shows that individual participation in political and community organisations increases the 
probability that individuals will engage in social mobilisation – transforming individual feelings 
of anger and frustrating into group-based action. As expected, participants in protests also 
tend to use of social media more than other individuals. The coefficients for social trust is not 
statistically significant.   
 
Country’s context. Table 3.1  shows that people tend to protest more in democratic contexts. 
This results is in line with Bellinger and Arce (2011), who show how the process of 
democratisation in Latin American countries has generated a revitalisation of collective 
political activity. Also in line with prior expectations, individuals living in richer countries are 
less inclined to protest.  
 
Table 3.1 Determinants of individual participation in protests in Latin America 2010, 
2012, 2014 
 
model_1 model_2 model_3 model_4 model_5 model_6 model_7 
                
Distributive beliefs 1.194*** 1.212*** 1.207*** 1.140*** 1.137*** 1.152*** 1.166*** 
 
[0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] 
Female 0.742*** 0.826*** 0.823*** 0.903*** 0.908*** 0.921*** 0.902*** 
 
[0.019] [0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] 
Age 0.991*** 0.998** 0.998** 0.997*** 0.998* 1.000 0.999 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Married 0.891*** 0.938** 0.933** 0.926** 0.939** 0.933** 0.942* 
 
[0.023] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Education  1.070*** 1.075*** 1.053*** 1.043*** 1.043*** 1.030*** 
 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Worker  1.368*** 1.379*** 1.347*** 1.330*** 1.319*** 1.236*** 
 
 [0.044] [0.045] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.045] 
Student  1.495*** 1.560*** 1.535*** 1.502*** 1.454*** 1.358*** 
 
 [0.080] [0.084] [0.090] [0.089] [0.086] [0.082] 
Worsening national economic conditions   1.036 1.022 1.019 1.027 1.095*** 
 
  [0.031] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.038] 
Worsening individual economic conditions   1.109*** 1.070* 1.071* 1.083** 1.142*** 
 
  [0.037] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.043] 
Ends meet   1.052*** 1.057*** 1.066*** 1.064*** 1.095*** 
 
  [0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] 
Ideology    0.928*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.928*** 
 
   [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
Political intersts    1.608*** 1.546*** 1.549*** 1.572*** 
 
   [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] 
Institution trust    0.941*** 0.939*** 0.940*** 0.951*** 
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   [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Corruption    1.261*** 1.238*** 1.262*** 1.248*** 
 
   [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049] 
Social trust     1.028* 1.024 1.006 
 
    [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Social networks     2.382*** 2.310*** 2.425*** 
 
    [0.117] [0.114] [0.123] 
Internet     1.062*** 1.094*** 1.107*** 
 
    [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] 
Gdp pc       0.917*** 0.874*** 
 
     [0.007] [0.039] 
Democracy      0.957*** 1.362*** 
 
     [0.015] [0.124] 
Constant 0.141*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.055*** 0.026*** 
 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
        
Country dummies No no No no no yes Yes 
Year Dummies No no No no no no Yes 
Observations 88,892 88,549 87,036 69,490 68,088 68,088 68,088 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 
3.2 Do absolute levels of inequality explain protests? 
An influential body of theoretical literature has argued that rising disparities fuel social 
discontent and motivate people to protest. In this section, we compare this prediction with our 
results above. In order to do so, we extend the previous model to include Gini coefficient 
data extracted from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC) (CEDLAS and the World Bank).4  Gini coefficients were computed following a 
standardised approach based on information from national household surveys.  
 
Table 3.2 (column 2 and 3) reports the regression results showing that the Gini coefficient is 
not statistically significant in any of the specifications. This result is in contrast with the 
existing theoretical literature and confirms our initial hypothesis that distributive beliefs have 
a stronger explanatory power for why people protests than objectives measures of inequality. 
There are almost no differences in the results for the other variables between the three 
model specifications.  
 
3.3 Does government policy matter? 
This section expands the empirical analysis above by taking into consideration the role of 
government policy as an explanation for why people protest. We examine in particular the 
quality of public services and the implementation of social protection programs. Existing 
studies suggest that fiscal policy could be used both to gain support and legitimation among 
some population groups and to reduce inequality. Redistribution could potentially lower 
societal grievances and reduce protests in two ways. First, it might affect living conditions, 
thereby reducing inequality and social discontent. Second, redistribution may influence 
attitudes and the voting choices of the median voter by increasing support for government 
institutions – a crucial factor in processes of democratic consolidation – as credibility and 
compliance tend to increase when the government demonstrates to care about people’s 
living conditions.  
 
However, redistribution has economic as well as political costs. In order to finance social 
protection programs targeted at the poorest, governments have to increase taxes. Middle 
                                                          
4  SEDLAC data are available at: http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/.  
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classes may accept to pay more taxes if spending adequately represents their preferences in 
terms of production and provision of public goods. In this way, “payment of taxes and 
provision of public services can be interpreted as a contractual relationship between 
taxpayers and the government” (Fjeldstad et al. 2009: 1). Yet, suspicions that government 
may wastes public resources is likely to provoke social discontent and lead to protests and 
further unrest. 
 
In light of these ambiguous effects, we analysed the role of government policies on protests 
using the following three questions: (i) “Would you say that the services the municipality is 
providing to the people are…?”; (ii) “thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very 
satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied the quality of public schools?”; and (iii) 
“And the quality of public medical and health services?”. We recoded the answers to these 
questions into a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if people think that the services the 
municipality is providing to them are very bad or if they are very dissatisfied with the quality 
of schools or health services. In addition, we include a dummy variable which assume value 
one if respondent benefited from a conditional cash transfers (CCT).5 Due to data 
constraints, the model estimated in Table 3.2  (column 4) refers only to 2012 and 2014. In 
order to develop a proper comparison, we also compare the results of this new specification 
with those of our baseline specification restricted to the period 2012 and 2014. 
 
It is interesting to observe that introducing these new variables does not affect the previous 
results. The only exceptions are the coefficient representing changes of economic conditions 
at the national level and the coefficient for GDP per capita. The impact of distributive beliefs 
on individual participation in protests remains almost unchanged.  
 
With respect to the new variables, Table 3.2 (column 4) shows that the CCT coefficient is 
lower than one and statistically significant. As expected, social transfers appear to be a 
useful tool to improve people’s perceptions and prevent the outbreak of protests. Notably, 
benefitting from a social protection program decreases the probability of an individual 
participating in protests.  
 
The coefficients that measure the quality of public services are higher than one and 
statistically significant indicating that lower satisfaction with public services increases the 
probability of individual participation in protests. The only exception is related with the 
coefficient of the quality of roads which is not statistically significant. These results confirm 
that the quality of these services is a key component of the fiscal exchange between state 
and taxpayers. 
 
One possible interpretation of these results is that governments in Latin America may have 
lost the consensus of the middle class (those more likely to protest as observed above), 
while increasing the support from the lowest income families. In fact, the middle class has 
lost more than other groups in recent process of imperfect democratisation and the 
redistribution in Latin America. In particular, governments have kept on taxing the middle 
class to finance social protection programs targeted to the poorest, but have not worked to 
improve the quality of services that may matter for the middle class. Saad-Filho and Morais 
(2014: 241) explain this situation in Brazil: “economic growth, income distribution and the 
wider availability of credit and tax breaks to domestic industry have led to an explosion in 
automobile sales, while woefully insufficient investment in infrastructure and in public 
transport has created traffic gridlock in many large cities. Rapid urbanisation has 
overwhelmed the electricity, water and sanitation systems, leading to power cuts and 
repeated disasters in the rainy season. Public health and education have expanded, but they 
are widely perceived to offer poor quality services”. 
                                                          
5  In 2014, there are no data for Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In 2012, we use info on social transfers rather than on 
CCT for Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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Table 3.2 Distributive beliefs, Gini coefficient and government policy as explanations 
for protests in Latin America 
 
Baseline 
Model 
Gini 
Gini + 
distributive 
beliefs 
Model + social 
policies 
Distributive beliefs 1.165***  1.164*** 1.139*** 
 
[0.035]  [0.035] [0.051] 
Gini  0.975 0.975  
  [0.018] [0.018]  
Female 0.902*** 0.901*** 0.902*** 0.910** 
 
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.042] 
Age 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Married 0.942* 0.942* 0.942* 0.956 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.044] 
Education 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.030*** 1.039*** 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] 
Worker 1.236*** 1.233*** 1.235*** 1.159*** 
 
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.061] 
Student 1.358*** 1.352*** 1.359*** 1.261** 
 
[0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.115] 
Worsening national economic conditions 1.097*** 1.096*** 1.095*** 1.035 
 
[0.039] [0.038] [0.038] [0.054] 
Worsening individual ec. conditions 1.143*** 1.139*** 1.142*** 1.121** 
 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.064] 
Ends meet 1.096*** 1.099*** 1.096*** 1.060** 
 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.031] 
Ideology 0.928*** 0.926*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] 
Political intersts 1.573*** 1.579*** 1.573*** 1.518*** 
 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.034] 
Institution trust 0.951*** 0.954*** 0.951*** 0.956*** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] 
Corruption 1.248*** 1.277*** 1.249*** 1.164*** 
 
[0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.067] 
Social trust 1.006 1.005 1.006 0.973 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.024] 
Social networks 2.422*** 2.439*** 2.428*** 2.657*** 
 
[0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.189] 
Internet 1.108*** 1.106*** 1.107*** 1.096*** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] 
Gdp pc  0.889* 0.867** 0.877* 0.674 
 
[0.063] [0.062] [0.063] [0.167] 
Democracy 1.356*** 1.370*** 1.368*** 2.734*** 
 
[0.124] [0.127] [0.126] [0.635] 
satisfaction with quality of roads    1.036 
    [0.032] 
satisfaction with quality of local services 
 
  1.104*** 
  
  [0.027] 
satisfaction with quality of health 
 
  1.084** 
 
 
  [0.036] 
satisfaction with quality of education 
 
  1.079** 
 
 
  [0.039] 
Beneficary of a cct program 
 
  0.742*** 
  
  [0.043] 
Constant 0.024*** 0.092** 0.080*** 0.018*** 
 
[0.009] [0.090] [0.078] [0.018] 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68,088 68,088 68,088 32,595 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4  Additional robustness tests 
In this section, we report a number of additional tests to check the validity of the results 
above. First, we test the sensitivity of the empirical analysis to a series of alternative 
estimators. Second, we test the validity of the results to the splitting of the sample in the two 
sub-regions: South America and Central America, including Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic. Third, we verify the robustness of the analysis using an alternative specification of 
the dependent variable. Fourth, we introduce a different specification of distributive beliefs. 
Finally, we test remaining potential concerns about endogeneity. 
 
(a) Alternative estimators. Our baseline estimates are derived from a logit model with country 
and time fixed effects in order to capture the structural differences across countries and 
years during the period of analysis. To check further validity of the results discussed above, 
we model the relationships of interest using alternative estimators including a probit model, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and a multilevel approach (ML).  
 
Logistic and probit models are suitable to deal with regressions in which the dependent 
variable is binary. The most important difference between these two estimators refers to 
assumptions about distribution errors. Usually, the results extracted from the logistic and 
probit models are very similar. The OLS estimator could also be used in conjunction with a 
binary dependent variable. In contrast to the previous estimators, OLS provide predicted 
values beyond the expected range from zero to one but the normal distribution and 
homogeneous error variance assumptions may not hold if there is large variation in the 
probability of the dependent event (Pohlman and Leitner 2003). Yet, OLS estimators are 
widely used because they provides a straightforward interpretation of the regression results. 
Finally, our dataset contains both micro- as well as macro-level information. If the micro-level 
variables that explain individual participation in protests are embedded within macro-level 
variables or processes, we may need to model our relation of interest using a multilevel 
model that takes into account hierarchical levels within the data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2008). In this setting, the maximum likelihood estimator could provide more efficient 
estimates of the coefficients and their standard errors (Snijders and Bosker 1999, Maas and 
Hox 2004).  
 
Table 4.1 (column 2 – 4) reports the results using the three alternative model specifications. 
As expected, logistic, probit and OLS models provide the same results (in terms of coefficient 
signs and significance) even though the coefficients are not directly comparable. The only 
difference is related to the coefficient of GDP per capita which is not statistically significant 
using the probit estimator. The multilevel model results are also similar with a few 
exceptions: age, married, worsening of national economic conditions, social trust and 
democracy. The positive effect of distributive beliefs remains strong and highly statistically 
significant across all model specifications. 
 
(b) Sensitivity to sample selection. In order to test further the robustness of the results above, 
we have split the sample into South America and other countries. This is because protests 
erupted more strongly in South America than in other areas (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
21 
 
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
C
o
st
a 
R
ic
a
D
o
m
in
ic
an
 R
e
p
E
l s
al
va
d
o
r
G
u
at
em
al
a
H
o
n
d
u
ra
s
M
ex
ic
o
N
ic
ar
ag
u
a
P
an
am
a
C
e
n
tr
al
 A
. &
 C
ar
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
B
o
liv
ia
B
ra
zi
l
C
h
ile
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
E
cu
ad
o
r
P
ar
ag
u
ay
P
er
u
U
ru
g
u
ay
V
en
e
zu
el
a
S
o
u
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
Figure 4.1. Percentage of people participating in protests by countries 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the LAPOP datasets. 
 
Table 4.1 (column 5 – 6) shows these results. The tables confirms that distributive beliefs are 
important  not only in South American countries (which have a slightly higher coefficient), but 
also in other parts of the region. Results for the various control variables are similar across 
these regressions, with a few exceptions. The age variable becomes significant while the 
gender coefficient is no longer statistically significant in the South America sample. Married is 
not significant in both regions while the student variable is not significant in the non-South 
America sample. Worsening of individual and national economic conditions are not factors 
explaining participation in protest in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. Finally, 
GDP per capita is lower than one and statistically significant in the non-South America 
sample, while democracy is lower than one in South America.   
 
(c) Alternative dependent variable. In this section, we re-estimate the regressions above 
using alternative dependent variables that measure individual participation in protests in 
different ways: (i) number of times each respondent as participated in protests in the 12 
months prior to the survey, (ii) approval of government critics’ right to peaceful 
demonstrations, and (iii) approval of those that participate in legal demonstrations. The two 
latter variables are ordinal dependent variables with answers ranging from 1 (strongly 
disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve). We use OLS to estimate these three additional 
regressions.  
 
Table 4.1 reports the new regression results. They are remarkably similar to those reported 
in the baseline regression when we estimated it using OLS. The results show that people 
who strongly believe that government should implement policies to reduce income inequality 
between the rich and the poor tend to protest with more frequency than others (Table 4.1, 
column 7). In addition, they tend to approve protests (Table 4.1, column 8) and sympathise 
with those participating in legal demonstrations (Table 4.1, column 9). 
 
(d) Alternative specification for distributive beliefs. In this section, we re-estimate our model 
using an alternative specification for distributive beliefs. The main independent variable we 
use is based on the question: “the [country] government should implement strong policies to 
reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or  
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Table 4.1 Additional robustness tests 
 Additional estimators Sample selection Alternative dependent variables (OLS estimator) 
Alternative 
specification 
for distributive 
beliefs 
 
Baseline model Probit model OLS 
Multilevel 
model 
South America 
Central 
America + 
Mexico + the 
Rep. 
Dominican 
number of 
times each 
respondent as 
participated in 
protests 
approval of 
government 
critics’ right to 
peaceful 
demonstrations 
approval of 
those that 
participate in 
legal 
demonstrations 
ordinal variable 
(1, disagree to 
7, agree) 
                  
Distributive beliefs 1.165*** 0.078*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 1.180*** 1.141*** 0.039*** 0.670*** 0.888***  
 
[0.035] [0.015] [0.002] [0.002] [0.045] [0.057] [0.008] [0.023] [0.023]  
Distributive beliefs 
(alternative 
specification) 
         1.033*** 
          [0.010] 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68,088 68,088 68,088 68,088 39,041 29,047 66,083 67,093 67,917 67,163 
R^2     0.052         
 
Notes: these models include the same set of independent variables included in the baseline specification. Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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disagree with this statement?”. In the regressions above, we coded the answers to this 
question into a binary indicator. In this section, we use the full range of answers ranging from 
1 (disagree) to 7 (agree). Table 7 (column 10) reports the regression results using the ordinal 
variable. The results are very similar to the baseline results, though the coefficient is lower as 
would be expected.  
 
4.1 Addressing endogeneity 
One concern with the results discussed so far is that of reverse causality. Distributive beliefs 
affect social mobilisation, which in turn may affect people’s perceptions of the actual level of 
inequality, their perceptions of current economic conditions and their political beliefs. In a 
recent paper, Madestam et al. (2013) show that political protests generate political changes 
in the USA: an increase in the number of protests rises political support for the Republican 
party. It is possible that these changes will lead people to update their distributive beliefs.   
 
One simple test to order to assess potential reverse causality would be to test whether 
individual participation in protests in previous years affects current distributive beliefs. 
Unfortunately, the data we use is not a panel (i.e. different individuals were interviewed in 
each year). Using an instrumental variable model is also challenging because it is unlikely 
that we will be able to find a purely exogenous variable that will affect protests only via 
distributive beliefs. We followed three alternative strategies to assess potential reverse 
causality based on collapsing information on protests at provincial level and merging this 
information along the different waves. The first strategy then regresses distributive beliefs in 
2014 on a dummy variable that indicates whether at least someone in the province 
participated in a protest in 2012. The second strategy regresses distributive beliefs in 2014 
on the average frequency of protests in the province in 2012. The last one refers to the 
number of people participating in protest in 2012. Unfortunately, we could make use of the 
information on number of protests since the data are not representative at subnational level.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the results for the three strategies. The results show that level of distributive 
beliefs in 2014 are not affected by past protests. This result is robust across different 
specifications, suggesting that reverse causality, at the very least, is not large enough to 
threaten the validity of the estimates in the paper. 
 
Table 4.2 Robustness tests on reverse causality (dependent variable: distributive 
beliefs in 2014) 
 
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3 
At least one protest in 2012 -0.050   
 
[0.065]   
Average probability to participate in protest 2012  0.137  
 
 [0.329]  
Number of people participating in protest 2012   0.000 
   [0.001] 
Constant 1.566*** 1.496*** 1.509*** 
 [0.255] [0.249] [0.246] 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,892 22,892 22,892 
Notes: these models include the same set of independent variables included in the baseline specification 
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5  Conclusions 
This paper addresses important knowledge gaps about social mobilisation and about the role 
of inequality and distributive beliefs in motivating people to engage in protests. The paper 
focuses on the case of Latin America, where several countries have experienced increases 
in protests and civil instability in recent years despite considerable reductions in inequality. 
Our main results show that subjective assessments of inequality may matter more for 
ordinary people than objective measures: individuals make decisions to participate on 
protests based on perceptions of inequality, proxied by distributive beliefs, rather than on 
absolute levels of inequality.  
 
This finding allows us to better understand a current paradox in Latin America, a region 
where protests and demonstrations are important ingredients of the policy making process. 
In recent years, protests have risen substantially across most countries in Latin America 
despite decreases in levels of the Gini coefficient. The results discussed in this paper 
suggest that individuals started to protest more because their perceptions of inequality and 
distributive beliefs did not accompany changes in absolute inequality. Despite reductions in 
the Gini coefficient, people still perceived that governments were not doing enough. The 
rapid economic growth and the resulting processes of modernisation led  to social changes 
which have not matched the expectations and aspirations of the vast majority of the 
population, leading to social discontent and protests. In particular the results show that 
people were dissatisfied with political institutions, levels of corruption and the quality of public 
services. 
 
These were issues that affected predominantly the middle classes: the employed, students 
and educated people, with greater interest in politics and a left-wing political orientation were 
more likely to participate in civil protests. Economic conditions also matter: individual 
participation in protests was also related to people’s perceptions about their current and past 
economic conditions, as well as by changes in national economic conditions. Social relations 
and networks were crucial to mobilising people’s anger and grievances into protests.   
 
The paper shows also the role of policy in affecting perceptions of inequality and mitigating 
the risk of civil unrest. The results indicate that redistribution via cash transfers to the poorest 
reduce the probability of protests, but the low quality of public services and high tax burdens 
have eroded the support of political institutions by the middle class. The recent choices of 
governments across Latin America to focus redistribution mainly on the poor (and excluding 
the middle class) have generated large gains in terms of poverty and inequality reduction. 
However, these choices may have also led to unintended consequences in terms of social 
and political stability. Overall, it appears that Latin American countries may have become 
victims of their own success because perceived forms of social change have not matched 
the expectations and aspirations of the vast majority of people, in particular the middle 
classes, provoking social discontent which in turn has erupted in protests. 
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